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The rash of international financial crises in the 1990s have stimulated great 
interest in models to predict crises and explain the patterns of contagion that follow crisis. 
In both of these respects analysis of the Asian crisis has proven to be quite controversial.  
While some economists have argued that the Thai crises should have been quite 
predictable based on the similarities between Thailand’s situation and that of the Mexican 
crisis two years prior, see, for example, Salvatore (1999), other economists have argued 
that the Thai crisis was not predictable on the basis of the then available research, see, for 
example, Furman and Stiglitz (1998).  Likewise some leading economists have argued 
that the pattern of contagion following the Thai crisis cannot be explained by rational 
economic models.
1  As a consequence they point to self-fulfilling and/or destabilizing 
speculation, rather than economic fundamental as the primary causes of the Thai crisis 
and subsequent international financial contagion.   
                                                          
 
*Corresponding Author: Claremont Institute of Economic Policy Studies, Claremont Graduate 




1 Unfortunately as yet there is no general agreement in the literature on the meaning of contagion.  Some 
use it to mean the spread of speculative attacks unjustified by the fundamentals, while others such as 
Eichengreen et al.  (1996) use it in a more neutral sense that a crisis in one country increases the probability 
of a crisis in other countries, whether justified by economic and financial interdependence and rational 
reevaluations of countries prospects or due to herding behavior.  We use contagion in their neutral sense 
and refer to pure contagion as contagion not justified by plausible expectations about fundamentals.  For a 
useful discussion of different concepts of contagion see Masson (1999).  
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There has also been considerable disagreement in the literature about the roles of 
real exchange rate appreciation and current account deficits in generating crisis and 
influencing the pattern of their spread across countries.  Some authors have found the 
exchange rate variable significant and the current account variable not (for example, 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995) and Kaminsky et al. (1998)), others find more support 
for current account variables (for example, Berg and Pattillo (1999a and b) and Bussière 
and Mulder (1999)), while still others find little support for either (Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998)).  Furthermore, it is not uncommon to assume that exchange rate and current 
account variables carry essentially the same information (see, for example, Kaminsky et 
al (1998) and Salvatore (1999)). 
We argue, however, that exchange rate and current account variables should be 
considered in relation to one another.  In general, the past statistical work on crises 
prediction and explanation has been insufficiently theoretically motivated. Typically 
these models take a large number of variables that theory suggests may be associated 
with crises and put them independently into a regression, but we should be able to 
improve on this.  International currency crises should be due primarily to actual or 
incipient balance of payments disequillibruium.  Many different factors can cause balance 
of payments problems.  The key to understanding balance of payments disequilibrium is 
recognition that it results from interrelations among variables that fail to provide 
equilibrium.   
It is only in terms of their interrelationships with other variables that we would 
expect most factors to be robustly related to serious balance of payments disequilibrium 
and international currency crisis.  Thus, for example, a current account deficit can be the   3 
result of an overvalued exchange rate in which case there is serious potential for crisis or 
it can be due to large inflows of foreign direct investment in which case there is much 
less cause for concern.  This paper presents initial efforts to operationalize this approach 
by developing and testing several composite variables designed to capture important 
aspects of whether the interrelations among these variables are in approximate balance or 
not.  Our statistical results suggest that, unlike the Furman-Stigliz exercise, the use of 
composite variables that relate substantial current account deficits to the behavior of real 
exchange rates and rates of foreign direct investment have considerable explanatory 
power with respect to the patterns of contagion following both the Mexican and the Thai 
crisis.
2  This presents a strong counter to the allegations that economists have had to 
come up with a new theory after each recent international financial crises and implies that 
the fundamentals have mattered much more than many critics of the behavior of 
international financial markets have posited. 
Empirical Studies on the Severity of Crisis 
A number of different approaches have been taken to the empirical study of the 
statistical correlates and predictor of currency crisis.
3  While some studies have sought to 
predict the timing of crisis, other have investigated to what extent economic and financial 
variables can help explain the pattern through which crisis spread from one country to 
another.  Our focus is on this later question.  The initial contribution to their literature 
                                                            
2 Since this paper was begun, papers by Berg and Pattillo (1999a and b) Bussière and Mulder (1999) 
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) and Tornell (1999) have also found that fundamentals have 
explanatory power for the pattern of contagion during the Asian crisis. Corsetti et al. use a combined 
measured for the exchange rate and current account that is quite similar to ours. 
 
3 For recent contributions and surveys of the literature see Berg and Patillo (1999a and b), Bussière and 
Mulder (1999), Goldstein and Reinhart (1999), and Kaminsky et al. (1998).   4 
was a highly influential paper by Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1995).  These authors 
analyze which countries were vulnerable to currency attacks as a result of the 1994 
Mexican Peso crisis by testing a cross-section of 20 emerging countries.
4  They regress a 
crisis index, the variance-weighted average of the percentage change in the nominal 
exchange rate and international reserves
5, on three fundamental factors: real exchange 
rates, banking fragility proxied by a percentage change in the bank loans to the private 
sector, and a ratio of M2 to international reserves. 
The authors argue that international investors try to avoid short-term capital losses 
and flee from countries in which the investors expect a large depreciation or devaluation 
in the near future.  Therefore, the magnitude of an exchange rate change would depend 
on the degree of initial real exchange rate appreciation.  The more appreciated the real 
exchange rate, the higher the chance of depreciation or devaluation.  In addition, the 
ability of a government to defend on exchange rate depends on the health of the local 
banking system.  The weaker the banking system, the more unwilling the government is 
to defend the currency by increasing interest rates that would weaken the banking system 
and the more likely the government would be to devalue the currency.  Lastly, since a 
capital reversal can be met by running down international reserves, the lower are the 
international reserves, the greater the chance of exchange rate devaluation.  Furthermore, 
the authors indicate that a country with real exchange rate appreciation and banking 
problems would suffer a severe crisis only if the country has both weak fundamentals and 
                                                            
4 The list of countries is Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and 
Zimbabwe.  
 
5 In their original development of a crisis index Eichengreen, et al (1994) (1995) also include the interest 
rate, but sufficient high quality data is not available to include this for developing countries.   5 
low international reserves.  Weak fundamentals are defined as when the real exchange 
rate appreciation and the growth in the bank loans are in the highest three quartiles of the 
sample.
6  Low international reserves are defined as when the ratio of M2 to foreign 
reserves is in the highest three quartile of the sample.
7  The Sachs et al. model find that 
real exchange rate appreciation and lending booms have positive effects on the crisis 
severity in countries with low international reserves and weak fundamentals, and do not 
have significant effects in countries with low reserves and strong fundamentals. 
Furman and Stiglitz (1998) apply the Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco approach using 
data from 1997 to explain the severity of the East Asian crisis.  Furman and Stiglitz’s 
samples include 34 emerging countries, 14 more than Sachs et al. used.
8  The authors find 
that only the coefficient for lending booms in a country with low international reserves 
and weak fundamentals is significant and of the correct sign.  The coefficient of real 
exchange appreciation in a country with low international reserves and weak 
fundamentals is marginally significant but of the wrong sign.  This implies that the real 
exchange rate appreciation plays a very small role in the severity of crisis and that, if 
anything, it would decrease the severity of crisis instead.  The R-squared is only 5 percent 
and the adjusted R-squared is –16 percent.  The authors interpret these weak empirical 
results as showing that “the East Asian crisis was a novel event” and could not be 
explained by declining macroeconomic fundamentals (p. 49). 
                                                            
6 Several authors have questioned the use of rankings within a sample or opposed to absolute measures.  
See comments by Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and comment by Cooper on Sachs et al (1996). 
7 In regards to the definition of “low reserves” and the definition of “weak fundamentals”, it might be better 
to label them as the absence of high reserves and the absence of strong fundamentals. 
8 The addition 14 countries are Bangladesh, Botswana, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, 
Israel, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia.   6 
One of the reasons that studies have found quite different results on the 
significance of real appreciation is that calculations for this variable have differed widely.  
This is due to differences in the base periods used, the number of currencies included in 
the index, and the method of calculation.  The variations in these calculations across 
studies for the Asian crisis have been particularly large for Argentina (ranging from 
+18.7 to –2.3) Indonesia (from +9.6 to –10.00). 
9  While not changing signs, calculations 
for China ranged from –7.0 to –35.9 and for Hungary from 0.0 to +31.4.  The calculations 
for Thailand were much more tightly bunched, ranging from +5.5 to +7.2. Malaysia 
ranged from +4.5 to +11.3 while the Philippines ranged from +11.9 to +28.4. 
Berg and Pattillo (1999a ) rerun the Sachs, Tornell and Velasco regression for the 
Mexican crisis with the same sample as the Sachs et al. study, but using the revised data 
currently available for that period.   Berg and Pattillo find that the revision of the data 
changes the estimated results from those of the original paper.   In particular, the 
estimated coefficient of the real exchange rate appreciation with weak fundamentals and 
low international reserves is no longer statistically significant.
10  They conclude, “[t]he 
fragility of the STV [Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco] results with respect to the data 
revisions that have taken place since their estimations…casts some doubt on the 
usefulness of this specification for the Asian crises” (p.121).  However, the fit of the 
model remains quite substantial.  In addition, Berg and Pattillo apply the Sachs, Tornell, 
and Velasco regression to the same variables during the 1997 Asian crisis.  Similar to the 
results of Furman and Stiglitz, they find that the regression fits relatively poorly for the 
                                                            
9 These ranges are based on the studies surveyed in Begg (1999), Bussière and Mulder (1999) and 
Nitithanprapas (2000). 
10 One of the reasons for the variety of findings on the effects of real appreciation are the substantial 
differences in the calculations used in different studies.  See Begg (1999).   7 
1997 samples and that only the lending boom combined with low reserves and weak 
fundamentals is significant and of the correct sign.  They find that the real exchange rate 
appreciation has no impact on severity of the 1997 Asian crisis. 
Tornell (1999) applies the Sachs, Tornell and Velasco model for the 1994 
Mexican crisis, for the 1997 Asian crisis, and for the combination of the two crises, with 
a different sample of 23 countries.
11   He finds that the Sachs, Tornell and Velasco model 
fits fairly well for the Tequila crisis, the Asian crisis, and the combined crises.
12  
Particularly, the cross-country variation in the crisis severity was largely determined by 
the three fundamentals: real exchange rate appreciation, lending booms, and low 
international reserves.  Tornell interprets the good fits of his regressions to mean that “the 
rule that links fundamentals to the crises’ severity has been the same in both the Tequila 
and Asian crises” (p.1). 
In summary, the Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco model clearly makes a major 
contribution in showing the important role that adequate levels of international reserves 
can play in protecting countries from currency crisis and that proxies for fragility of the 
domestic banking system are an important part of the fundamentals.  The further 
empirical applications of their model raise questions, however, about its capability to 
explain the Asian crisis and about the usefulness of including measures of real exchange 
rate appreciation and current account deficit among the fundamentals.  In the following 
                                                            
11 The samples include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
 
12 Commenting on an early version of Tornell’s paper, Berg and Pattillo (1999a) argue that Tornell’s good 
results are due to a variety of apparently small modifications and suggest that this shows the fragility of this 
approach.   8 
section we discuss problems in creating proxies for the strength of currency crisis and 
develop a composite variable approach that focuses on the interrelationships among real 
exchange rate appreciation, current account deficits, and foreign direct investment.  We 
use this model both to study the patterns of contagion and to test several hypotheses such 
as the Lawson dogma and the joint importance of exchange rate and current account 
development. 
Methodology 
Dependent Variable: A Crisis Index 
In order to determine the degree of vulnerability to financial contagion or the 
severity of crisis, an operational definition of crisis is needed.  A currency crisis is 
defined as speculative pressures in the foreign exchange markets.  Following 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994) (1995), the speculative pressures can be 
reflected in a change in nominal exchange rate (devaluation/depreciation), a change in 
international reserves, or a change in interest rates.
13  The basic idea is that when there 
are speculative runs on currency, the government has three policy choices.  First, it can 
let the exchange rate depreciate.  Second, it can intervene in the foreign exchange 
markets by selling international reserves.  Lastly, it can increase interest rates to entice 
capital inflows in order to offset the speculative pressures on domestic currency.   Some 
countries may use a combination of these three policy options to absorb speculative 
pressures. 
                                                            
13 This concept is essentially in the exchange market pressure variable advanced by Girton and Roper 
(1977).   9 
  Because there is no cross-country comparable interest rate data for emerging 
countries, we exclude the change in interest rate from the crisis index as have other 
studies.  Thus, the crisis index is a weighted average of the depreciation rate of the 
nominal exchange rates and the percentage change in international reserves.  An increase 
in the crisis index, caused by an increase in the depreciation/devaluation rate or a drop in 
foreign exchange reserves corresponds to a more severe crisis.  Note that this type of 
crisis index is a continuous variable that can measure the degree of crisis intensity.
14 
  The difficult with this concept is how to weight the importance of changes in 
reserves versus changes in exchange rates.  As Eichengreen et al.(1994) (1995) argue that 
ideally the weights should be derived from the excess demand for foreign exchange from 
an empirical model of the exchange rate, i.e. by the slope coefficient that reflects how 
much official intervention (change in reserves) would be required to avoid a one 
percentage point change in the exchange rate.  The problem is that, as they note, there is 
little agreement within the profession about the most appropriate theoretical model of the 
foreign exchange market and none of our models fit well empirically.  Thus they note that 
it is important to check the sensitivity of the results to the weights used.  Unfortunately, 
however, most of the subsequent literature has paid no attention to this important 
warning.
15  Instead most studies have followed Eichengreen et al.’s suggestion to use 
calculations of precision, the inverse of the variance, of the variables as weights without 
either reporting these weights or checking the sensitivity of the results to different 
weights.  
                                                            
14 Some papers use discrete measures of crisis, typically when the index value deviates from its mean by 
more than two or three standard deviations. 
15 An exception is Glick and Hutchison (1999).   10 
The only instances of which we are aware that the weights are reported are in 
Weber’s (1995) discussion of Eichengreen et al’s (1995) original paper.  There the 
weights were 7.5 for changes in the exchange rate and 51.9 for changes in interest rates 
where changes in reserves are given a unit weight.  Weber questioned these weights and 
suggested an equal weighting instead. 
Not surprisingly precision weights can vary drastically across countries and time 
as devaluations occur and exchange rate regimes are changed.  For example in our 
sample using two years of monthly data to calculate the precision weights, given to 
reserve changes when exchange rate changes are given a unit weight for the Mexican 
crisis they range from 17.87  for Brazil to 0.00 for Indonesia, Pakistan, Argentina and 
Jordan.  From the Asian crisis the weight for Brazil dropped to 0.00 where it was joined 
by Argentina, China, and Uruguay.  Venezuela took over the highest weight with 7.29, up 
from 1.75 for the Mexican crisis. 
What was much more surprising to us was that large changes in the weights 
typically had relatively little effect on the ordinal rankings of countries in terms of the 
severity of speculative pressure.  This explains why our empirical results show little 
sensitivity to changes in the weights. (We varied the weights from 10.00 to 0.1).  As will 
be discussed later, what does appear to affect the results of different studies substantially 
is the large differences in calculation of real exchange appreciation. 
  This is particularly unfortunate because precision weights are inappropriate for 
use in the calculation of indices of currency crisis.  They would be entirely appropriate 
for the calculation of indices of volatility or crisis based on averages of free market 
variables such as stock market indices for a number of different countries.  The idea is to   11 
capture the degree of volatility in a particular market at a particular time in relation to its 
normal volatility.  If, for example, one variable is normally much more volatile than 
another, then an unweighted average would be excessively heavily driven by the behavior 
of the more volatile series.  Many foreign exchange markets, however, are managed by 
governments.  The relative variance of exchange rate changes and reserve changes will be 
heavily influenced by the exchange rate regime being followed and precision measures 
will reflect the government’s reaction function, not the slope of the excess demand 
schedule in the foreign exchange market. 
As a consequence, precision weights will substantially understate the severity of 
unsuccessful speculative attacks under fixed exchange rates such as hit Argentina 
following both the Mexican and Thai crisis and hit Hong Kong during the Asian crisis.  
This is easy to see.  Under a regime of narrow band fixed exchange rates, almost all of 
the effects of incipient payments imbalances will fall on changes in reserves rather than 
changes in exchange rates.  Since reserve changes will have a much higher variance, 
precision weights will give reserve changes little weight.  Thus as long as the speculative 
attacks are unsuccessful their magnitude will be understated.  By the same token, if a 
country is successfully knocked off from a narrow band peg, the heavy weight given to 
the subsequent currency depreciation will overstate the magnitude of speculative 
pressure.  
One approach to guesstimating the weights would be to assume a foreign 
exchange market with rational expectations and calculate how much of a change in the 
exchange rate would be required to bring about an adjustment in the current amount equal 
to the size of the intervention.  This would correspond to a flow equilibrium on the   12 
assumption that the intervention would be repeated each period.  In this case we could 
use the Marshall – Lerner conditions to derive the slope coefficient as a function of the 
sum of the country’s demand elasticity for exports and imports.  Since the crisis indices 
focus on the percentage change in reserves, the initial level of reserves also needs to be 
specified.  Taking the ratio of reserves to imports is also a convenient formulation in 
relation to the Marshall – Lerner equation.  See Nitithanprapas (2000). 
Our high weight on reserves corresponds to such a long run flow equilibrium for a 
country with fairly high elasticities and/or ratio of reserves to imports.  In addition to our 
base case of equal weighting we also report ratios of four to one and one to four to check 
the sensitivity of our results.  During crisis, however, speculative considerations and risk 
aversion could lead to short-run slope coefficients that differed substantially from these 
long-run trade-based calculations.  These considerations could cut in either direction.   
With strongly held expectations, speculative capital flows could add to the elasticity of 
the excess demand schedule, thus increasing the weight that should be given to changes 
in reserves.  On the other hand, a substantial increase in uncertainty associated with a 
crisis could make the speculative and excess demand schedules much less elastic, 
increasing the weight that should be given to exchange rate changes in the crisis index.  
Our one to four ratio of weights corresponds to this latter view of foreign exchange 
markets during crisis.  (For arguments that this was frequently the case during the Asian 
crisis see Willett (2000)).  Thus there appears to be a substantial range of plausible 
weights for the crisis index.  Fortunately, however, our sensitivity analysis presented in 
the last section finds that our major findings are robust with respect to substantial changes   13 
in the weights in the crisis index.
16  We believe that it is important, however, to recognize 
that the precision of precision weights is largely spurious.   
Independent Variables 
  It has been hypothesized that crisis contagion across countries is systematically 
related to weak economic fundamentals.  The crisis contagion is defined as when a crisis 
in one country increases the probability of a crisis in another country.  However, the 
crisis contagion can be divided into two concepts:  fundamentals-based contagion, where 
the spread of crisis can be explained by economic and political fundamentals, and true 
contagion, where the spread of crisis is caused by herding behavior fundamentals.  In this 
paper, we focus on fundamentals-based contagion and search for common fundamental 
factors that may be able to explain at least some of the crisis contagion.  The fundamental 
factors are divided into three groups: external vulnerability, internal vulnerability, and 
vulnerability to capital flight.  The factors used here as independent variables are 
explained below. 
- External Vulnerability  
International currency crises should be due primarily to actual or incipient balance 
of payments disequilibrium.  The balance of payments problem results from interrelations 
among variables that fail to provide equilibrium.  Equilibrium, in economic analysis, is “a 
constellation of selected interrelated variables so adjusted to one another that no inherent 
tendency to change prevails in the model which they constitute” (Machlup, 1964, p.119).  
                                                            
16 While we report only the results for the one to one, four to one, and one to four ratios, as we think these 
are a plausible range, we also checked ratios running from ten to one to one to ten and found that even 
variations this large did not have major effects on the results.   14 
In the Sachs et al. model, it is implicitly assumed that real exchange rate variable is the 
summary variable for balance of payments problems.  However, balance of payments 
disequilibrium may not result from real exchange rate appreciation alone, nor will the 
extent of real appreciation necessarily be the best indicator to use.  Although there are 
many variables that may indicate and/or contribute to balance of payments problems, this 
paper focuses on interrelations among several important ones; the budget balance, current 
account, real exchange rate, and capital flows.
17  In this paper, several composite 
variables are designed to test whether or not the interrelations among these variables 
increase the severity of crisis. 
1) Fiscal Budget and Current Account 
The “Lawson Dogma” suggests that the current account deficit is worrisome only 
if it is caused by a high fiscal deficit.
18  According to the national income identity, the 
current account is equal to the sum of the budget deficit and the gap between private 
investment and private saving.  The “Lawson Dogma” claims that the imbalance in the 
private investment-saving decisions reflects an intertemporal adjustment to smooth 
consumption, thus need not to be worried.  The basic idea of this view is that a fall in net 
private saving (or an increase in current consumption) occurs when consumers expect 
higher future income and higher permanent income.  However, many economists argue 
that “the Lawson Dogma” does not hold because private rather than public deficits 
                                                            
17 IMF (1999b) studies have also considered composite indicators of vulnerability to contagion between 
crisis and noncrisis countries, but have not reported econometric tests for the significance of the composite 
indicators. 
18  For discussions of the influence of the Lawson dogma on analysis of Mexico prior to its crisis, see 
Dornbusch et al. (1995) and Willett (2000).   15 
largely caused the crisis in Mexico in 1994, and in a number of Asian countries in 1997-
1998.  It is, thus, interesting to test whether or not such claims hold. 
2) Real Exchange Rate and Current Account 
A current account deficit should be more worrisome if it is accompanied by a real 
exchange rate appreciation.  The basic idea is that a real exchange rate appreciation due 
to capital inflows under a flexible exchange rate or domestic inflation above foreign 
levels under a pegged rate will cause a loss of competitiveness, thus worsening the 
current account deficit.  Hence, the more appreciated the real exchange rate is, the higher 
the rate of depreciation or devaluation that is needed to generate a more sustainable 
current account position.   
On the other hand, if real appreciation is due primarily to higher rates of 
productivity growth, then this should not be a source of declining competitiveness and 
future balance of payments problems.  Thus it is when real appreciation and large current 
account deficits are found together that the situation should be most worrisome.  The 
current account deficit can thus help to screen the “bad” real exchange rate appreciation 
from the “good” real exchange rate appreciation.  The “good” real exchange rate 
appreciation, resulting from an increase in productivity in the tradable sectors relative to 
the nontradable sectors, generates a current account surplus and need not be cause of 
worry.  On the other hand, when the real exchange rate appreciation is accompanied by a   16 
current account deficit, it may signal a “bad” appreciation that would reduce the 
competitiveness and worsen the current account deficit.
19 
This approach can be implemented through a dummy variable threshold analysis 
either by including the current account deficit when real appreciation is above a threshold 
or by including the amount or real appreciation when the current account deficit is above 
a threshold.  One way does not seem clearly preferable to the other on theoretical grounds 
so we test both.  
Note that this relationship is of particular interest because real exchange rate and 
current account variables are the most controversial indicators in terms of empirical 
results across studies.  Dominick Salvatore (1999) excludes the real exchange rate 
variable from his preferred indicators because he argues it does not add information to 
that contained in the current account variable.  On the other hand, Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
exclude the current account from their preferred set of warning indicators of currency 
crisis on the basis of its poor performance in earlier studies.  They suggest that it does not 
add information to that embodied in the real exchange rate variable.  These opposite 
views clearly highlight the need to pay more attention to potential interaction between the 
current account and the real exchange rate. 
                                                            
19 The importance of this point has not escaped the IMF.  The May 1999 World Economic Outlook notes 
that “a variable that may not be significant in isolation may be important because of its interaction with 
others; conversely, a variable that may appear relevant on its own may no longer be so when other variables 
are considered” (p. 79) and gives the example of real exchange rate appreciation due to productivity 
growth.  They group variables into composite indicators of external imbalances, internal imbalances, trade 
spillovers, and financial vulnerability.  For external balances they use a weighted average of measures of 
real appreciation, productivity growth in the export sector and current account deficits, but do not consider 
the threshold approach.  Comparing the indicators for crisis and non-crisis countries in a large sample of 20 
industrial and 41 emerging market countries they conclude that “External imbalances were particularly 
important for differentiating between crisis and non-crisis countries for emerging markets and during the 
Asian and Russian crisis” p. 80. 
   17 
  3) Current Account Deficit, FDI, and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation 
It is widely held that a current account deficit is less worrisome if it is financed by 
foreign direct investment.  See, for example, Salvatore (1999), Bussière and Mulder 
(1999), Frankel and Rose (1996), and Chuhan et al. (1997,1996).  Foreign direct 
investments are less susceptible to capital flight because investors cannot liquidate their 
fixed properties, such as plants and machines, in a short period of time when a shock 
occurs.
20  On the other hand, the portfolio investors or short-term lenders can sell their 
assets or refuse to rollover their loans relatively quickly.  In this case, the country with a 
current account deficit must induce severe adjustments by devaluing the domestic 
currency or by reducing domestic absorption to close the gap, thus intensifying the crisis.  
Another explanation is that foreign direct investment is commonly used to finance 
investment that helps to generate future earnings, while short-term and portfolio capital 
flows can be used to finance consumption that would worsen the future current account 
deficit.  Thus, foreign direct investment is likely to be associated with better prospects for 
future export growth. 
Therefore, balance of payments problems should be less likely the higher the 
proportion of a current account deficit that is financed by FDI and when this is not 
accompanied by substantial real exchange rate appreciation that would cause additional 
worsening of the current account deficit.   
- Domestic Vulnerability (Banking Problem) 
                                                            
20 Of course, multinational corporations are likely to also have liquid funds which can be moved so this 
distinction should not be overdrawn.   See more discussion of this view in Dooley et al. (1994).   18 
Unlike simple balance of payment crises, the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the 
recent Asian crisis in 1997 show that banking problems can be a major source of a 
country’s vulnerability.  In particular, when the banking system is weak, the government 
is reluctant to raise interest rates to defend the exchange rate because the higher rates 
might weaken the banking systems.  As a consequence, the weaker the banking system, 
the more likely are speculators to attack the currency.  The task of measuring bank 
weaknesses is a difficult one.  Most recent empirical studies, including those reviewed in 
section 2, have used the growth rate of bank claims on the private sector as a proxy of 
bank weakness.  The basic idea is that when lending expands very fast in a short period of 
time, it is very difficult for banks to separate good projects from bad and it is very 
difficult for authorities to supervise the banks, thus decreasing loan quality and increasing 
the vulnerability of banks. 
- Vulnerability to Capital Flight 
A country is more vulnerable to capital flight when the country’s short-term 
obligations in foreign currency surpass the country’s foreign reserves.  In particular, in 
the onset of a crisis when investors lose confidence, they move assets out of the country.  
However, if the country has enough international reserves to offset all short-term capital 
outflows, the country remains liquid.  In order to evaluate the adequacy of international 
reserves, they should be compared to short-term obligations that investors can move at 
short notice.  Thus in contrast to the traditional use of the ratio of reserves to imports, 
Calvo (1996) suggests the scaling of international reserves by liquid monetary assets 
(M2) because investors can convert them quickly into foreign currency in the short-run.  
Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue that the ratio of short-  19 
term international debts to foreign reserves is a powerful measure of illiquidity because 
foreign creditors can refuse to roll over short-term loans in the short run.  We consider 
both indicators.
21 
Data Set and Country Sample 
  Most of our data set are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-
ROM.  The exception are the real exchange rate variable and the external debt variable..  
The real exchange rate used in this paper is the real effective exchange rate index from 
the J.P. Morgan real exchange rate database.
22 The external debt data are from the 
database of the joint institues of OECD, BIS, World Bank , and IMF. The construction of 
variables is presented in the data appendix.  Since an estimation of factors of 
vulnerability to recent financial crises in emerging economies is the main focus of this 
paper, the samples are selected from the Comparative Statistics for Emerging Market 
Economies of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), with the exclusion of the oil-
exporting countries and some transitional economies in Eastern Europe because of poor 
or unavailable data.  However, the sample includes the two developed countries, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, that were relevant in the recent Asian financial crisis.  The 
complete list of countries is Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, 
                                                            
21 A problem of course is that a country net reserve positions may differ substantially from its officially 
report gross reserve position.  For example, Thailand had net reserve position in May 1997 only 5.3 billion 
U.S. dollar, due to the sales of the forward contract of 28 billion U.S. dollar.   
22 See the construction of the J.P. Morgan real effective exchange rate in J.P.Morgan (1994).   20 
Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
23  Since the sample size for both the 1994 Mexican 
crisis period and the 1997 East Asian crisis is small (26 data points each), this empirical 
study stacks data across countries from both the Mexican and Asian crisis periods, 
making a total of 52 observations.  The basic motivation of pooling the samples is that it 
provides more efficient estimation and inference.  Another major benefit of combining 
the two crisis episodes is that the model, if properly specified, can be used to test whether 
the factors that influenced the ripple from the “Asian Flu” are broadly similar to those of 
the 1995 “Tequila Effect”. 
Estimation Method 
The slope dummies regression is chosen as the estimation method.
24  T h i s  
specification allows the coefficient to be different depending on the condition specified 
by the dummy variable.  Essentially, the slope dummy variables allow us to consider 
interactions among fundamental factors of vulnerability.   The effects of external or 
internal problems on severity of the crisis index depend on whether a country has high or 
low international reserves.  Hence, the estimated regression takes the form: 
  IND = b1 + b2 (COMi) + b3 (LB) + b4 (COMi * Dhr) + b5 (LB * Dhr) + ε  
IND  = Indicator-weighted average of the exchange rate change with respect to the U.S. 
dollar and the percentage change in foreign reserves.  
                                                            
23 The samples have six more countries than Sachs et al. (1996), three more countries than Tornell (1999), 
but eight less countries than Furman and Stiglitz (1998). 
24 For an econometric analysis of the slope dummies regression, see Studenmund (1998).     21 
   COMi = Composite variables of balance of payments disequilibrium (i = the 
number of the composite variable), where     COM 1 = (Current Account/GDP)  if 
(Budget Deficit/GDP) > x Percent
25, where x is initially taken as 3 percent,
26 and  
                          = 0  Otherwise. 
      COM2 =  Real Effective Exchange Rate  if  (Current Account/GDP) < y 
percent, where y is initially taken as –5 percent,
 27 and 
                 =  0  Otherwise. 
      COM3 = (Current Account/GDP) if Real Exchange Rate Appreciation > 
percent, where z is initially taken as 10 percent,
 28 and 
                           =  0  Otherwise. 
      COM4 = (Current Account/GDP)– (FDI/GDP) if Real Exchange Rate 
Appreciation > w percent, and 
                           =  0  Otherwise. 
LB  = Percentage change in the ratio of the claims on private sectors by banks to GDP 
over the preceding four-year period
29 
                                                            
25 In all cases, the size of the threshold effects assumed are somewhat, but not entirely, arbitrary.  The 
results of sensitivity testing for the levels of thresholds is discussed below. 
26 Salvatore (1999) argues, “although there is no specific level of the budget deficit that spells inevitable 
trouble, a budget deficit of 3 percent of GDP or larger can usually be taken as a serious warning signal of 
possible future problems for the nation”(p. 343). 
27 Summers (1995) suggests “that close attention should be paid to any current account deficit in excess of 
5% of GDP” (p. 47). 
28 The optimal threshold of real exchange rate appreciation for both currency and banking crises has been 
estimated to be 10 percent (Goldstein, 1997). 
29 This period of lending booms is used so as to be able to compare with the previous studies. However, 
different time periods are used to test for the sensitivity analysis.   22 
Dhr  = Dummy for high international reserves, where 
Dhr  = 1 if the ratio of M2 to the stock of foreign reserves is less than the lowest quartile 
of the sample
30 ,and  
        = 0  Otherwise. 
  The multiplication of the COMi and Dhr, and the LB and Dhr are the interaction 
terms.  This means that when a country lacks high international reserves, the effect of a 
composite external imbalance and a lending boom would be captured by b2 and b3.   
When a country has high international reserves, on the other hand, the effects of a 
composite external imbalance and a lending boom are captured by b2 + b4 and b3 + b5. 
The hypotheses on the signs and the significant effects of coefficients are as follows.  
Firstly, a composite variable (COMi) matters when a country has a lack of high 
international reserves, i.e., b2 > or < 0, but does not matter when a country has high 
international reserves, i.e., b2 + b4 = 0.  Secondly, a lending boom (LB) also only matters 
when a country lacks high international reserves, i.e., b3 > 0, but it does not matter when 
a country has high international reserves, i.e., b3 + b5 = 0.   
  This estimation method is similar to the Sachs et al. formulation, except that this 
model does not have the interactive term between fundamental variables and the dummy 
for weak fundamentals, which is created by ranking the same fundamental factors in the 
quartile scale.  By excluding the dummy for weak fundamentals, we are able to aggregate 
other important fundamental factors into the composite variable.  The ideal estimation 
would be to consider all of the important factors and the dummy for weak fundamental 
                                                            
30 This definition is used so as to be able to compare with the previous studies.  Different definitions are 
used in the sensitivity analysis.   23 
factors simultaneously.  Nonetheless, given the small sample size, this would cause 
problem from lack of degrees of freedom.  Thus, to focus on interrelations among 
fundamental variables that are of particular interest, the estimation method considers only 
the interaction between the composite of fundamental indicators and the dummy for high 
international reserves.  The estimated results are presented in the next section. 
Empirical Results 
The “Lawson Dogma” argues that the current account deficit is worrisome only if 
it is caused by fiscal deficits.  COM1 variable is used to capture the interrelation between 
the current account deficit and the fiscal budget deficit.  The COM1 is current account 
over GDP if the government budget deficit over GDP is greater than the threshold of 
three percent; otherwise, it is zero.  The regression results in table 1 show that the 
estimated coefficient of COM1 (b2) in countries lacking high foreign reserves are 
negative, although insignificant, in 1994 sample, in 1997 sample, and in the combined 
samples.  The result implies that the “Lawson Dogma” fails to explain the 1994 and the 
1997 crises and that the absence of a budget deficit does not guarantee that a country will 
not have a crisis, although a substantial deficit makes a crisis more likely.  The 
coefficients of lending booms (b3) in countries lacking high reserves are positive and 
significant in all samples.  This means that excessive credit expansion, as a proxy of bank 
weaknesses, increases the vulnerability of a country to a crisis.  The Wald coefficient test 
cannot reject the null hypotheses of b2 + b4 = 0 and b3 + b5 = 0, implying that high 
international reserves can prevent vulnerable countries from suffering a severe crisis.   
The adjusted R-squareds for the 1994 sample, for the 1997 sample, and for the combined 
samples are 0.42, 0.05, and 0.29, respectively.   24 
ADD TABLE 1 
  Table 2 shows the regression results using the first combination (COM2) of real 
exchange rate appreciation and current account deficits.  For the 1994 Mexican crisis 
period, shown in column 3, the estimated coefficient of COM2 (b2) is, as expected, 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level in the absence of high foreign reserve 
countries.  This implies that a “bad” real exchange rate appreciation, screened by the 
current account deficit, increases the severity of the crisis.  The estimated coefficient of 
the lending booms (b3) is also positive and significant in the absence of high foreign 
reserve countries.  The Wald coefficient tests indicate that the hypotheses of b2 + b4 = 0 
and b3 + b5 = 0 cannot be rejected, implying that high foreign reserves can protect an 
otherwise vulnerable country from suffering a severe crisis.  Similar results are obtained 
when applying the COM2 to the 1997 East Asian Crisis (see column 4) and to both the 
1994 Mexican crisis and the 1997 crisis together (see column 5).   Although considering a 
real exchange rate appreciation by itself may not be significant
31, it has a significant 
effect on the severity of crises when considered in interrelation to the current account 
deficit. 
The adjusted R-squareds for our equations rise in all samples compared with the 
COM1 formulation.  They are also higher than in the Sachs, Tornell and Velasco model 
in which real exchange rate appreciation is put into the regression independently.   The 
0.55 adjusted R-squared in the Mexican crisis sample is a little higher than the 0.54 
adjusted R-squared of the model in Sachs et al. (1996).  In the Asian crisis sample, the 
                                                            
31 As was found in Furman and Stiglitz (1998), our real exchange rate variable is insignificant when we 
entered it independently in the regression.   25 
0.21 adjusted R-squared is much higher than the –0.16 of the regression in Furman and 
Stiglitz (1998).  This suggests that the model has considerable explanatory power with 
respect to the severity of Asian crisis in 1997.  In the combined crises, the 0.39 adjusted 
R-squared is roughly the same as that of the regression in Tornell (1999). 
ADD TABLE 2 
  Table 3 shows the regression results using the alternative combination (COM3) of 
current account deficit and real exchange rate appreciation.  COM3 is a current account 
balance over GDP if the real effective exchange rate appreciates by more than the ten-
percent threshold; otherwise, it is zero. We know of no theoretical reason to prefer one 
formulation over the other.  Thus, we tried both.  As expected, the coefficients of COM3 
(b2) in the absence of high reserve countries are negative and significant at 5 percent in 
all three samples.  They vary much less across periods than do those with the COM2 
formulation.  The point estimates of coefficients b2 are -4.91, -4.99, and -4.96 for the 
1994 Mexican crisis sample, the 1997 East Asian crisis sample, and for combined 
samples, respectively.  These results suggest that a current account deficit that is caused 
by a real exchange rate appreciation plays a significant role in increasing a country’s 
vulnerability to contagion.  In addition, the coefficients of lending booms (b3) in the 
absence of high reserves are positive and significant at 5 percent in all three cases.  The 
point estimates of b3 for the 1994 Mexican crisis, the 1997 East Asian crisis, and both 
episodes are more stable than in the COM1 and COM2 formulations, being 0.23, 0.22, 
0.22, respectively.  These fall roughly in the middle of the range of estimates found in 
Tables 1 and 2 (0.14 to 0.30).  These results suggest that bank weakness also plays an 
important role in determining the severity of currency crisis.  The Wald coefficient tests   26 
cannot reject the null hypotheses of b2 + b4 = 0 and b3 + b5 = 0, implying that both the 
effect of COM3 and the effect of Lending Booms matter only in countries that lack high 
international reserves. 
  Compared to the adjusted R-squareds of the COM2 regressions, the adjusted R-
squared of the COM3 regressions are higher in all samples. The adjusted R-Squared for 
the 1994 sample is 0.64 as compared with 0.55 for the COM2 model over the same 
period.  The adjusted R-squared is 0.28 for the 1997 sample compared with the 0.21 for 
the COM2 model over the same time period.   In the combined 1994 and 1997 sample, 
the adjusted R-squared is 0.52 for COM3 compared with 0.39 for the COM2 model.  
  These results question the interpretations of Sachs et al. (1996) and Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1996) that their insignificant results for the current account deficit when it is 
entered independently suggests that the current account deficit plays no role in explaining 
the pattern of currency crisis. In our analysis the current account deficit is in fact very 
significant when it is combined with substantial real exchange rate appreciation 
  Given the better fit of the COM3 than the COM2 formulation of the 
interrelationship of appreciation and the current account deficit, we use it when we 
replace the current account deficit with the portion of the deficit not financed by FDI. 
  ADD TABLE 3 
COM4 is the current account over GDP, minus FDI over GDP, if the real 
exchange rate appreciates by more than the ten-percent threshold
32; otherwise, it is zero.  
                                                            
32  Different definitions of variables and a variety of thresholds are used to test the robustness of the results 
in the next section.   27 
Table 4 shows that the estimated coefficients of COM4 (b2) are negative and significant 
at the 5 percent level in all samples.  The point estimates of b2 are -3.75 for the 1994 
Mexican crisis, -4.24 for the 1997 East Asian crisis, and -3.93 for the combined crises.  
The Wald coefficient test can not reject the null hypothesis b2 + b4 = 0, supporting the 
hypothesis that the effect of COM4 on the severity of the crisis index matters only in 
countries lacking high international reserves.  In other words, again we find that high 
international reserves can prevent countries with external deficits from suffering a severe 
crisis.  The estimated coefficients of lending booms (b3) are positive and significant at 
the five-percent level in all samples.  The point estimates of b3 are 0.25 for the 1994 
Mexican crisis, 0.20 for the 1997 East Asian crisis, and 0.22 for the combined episodes.  
The null hypothesis of b3 + b5 = 0 cannot be rejected by the Wald coefficient test, 
implying that high international reserves can prevent countries with internal problems 
from suffering a severe crisis.   
The R-squareds and adjusted R-squareds for all regressions fit all samples quite 
well.  In order to evaluate the fits of the results, the adjusted R-Squared is compared to 
the best-fit regression from the previous model using the COM3.  The adjusted R-square 
of 0.67 for the 1994 sample is higher than the 0.64 for the model using the COM3 over 
the same sample.  The adjusted R-squared of 0.22 for the 1997 sample, however, is a 
little smaller than the 0.28 for the model using the COM3 variable over the same time 
period.  The adjusted R-squared of 0.52 is similar to that of the model using the COM3 
variable for the combined sample.  Thus there is not a clear basis in the statistical results 
for choosing between these two formulations.  On theoretical grounds we prefer COM4 
and thus take it as our base case for the sensitivity testing reported below.   28 
ADD TABLE 4 
ADD TABLE 5 
Structural Stability Test 
Because the sample size during the 1994 Mexican crisis period and during the 
1997 East Asian crisis is so small (26 data points each), we choose the regression that 
pools observations for the 1994 and 1997 crises as the benchmark, to give a higher 
confidence in the estimation results, which is represented in the last column of table 4.  In 
order to use this benchmark with confidence, however, the Chow Structural Stability test 
is used to see whether the 1994 crisis and the 1997 crisis are identical in structure.  We 
find that the observed F-value from the Chow test is 0.47, with a p-value of 0.79, which 
is lower than the critical value at the 5-percent significance level.  Thus, the null 
hypothesis of identical structures cannot be rejected.  This result presents a counter to the 
allegations that economists have to come up with a new theory after each financial crisis.   
Sensitivity Analyses 
Since the benchmark regression takes into account the cross-sectional and time-
series characteristics of the two crisis episodes and implicitly assumes that the regression 
parameters do not differ between various countries. We tested for fixed and random 
effects in table 5 and found that the null hypothesis of no fixed effects and no-random 
effects cannot be rejected. 
33 
                                                            
33 Bussière and Mulder (1999) and Tornell (1999) find similar results.   29 
To test the sensitivity of the benchmark results, we perform a number of tests.  
We test whether the benchmark regression is sensitive to different crisis index intervals 
and to different weights on reserve and exchange rate changes in the crisis index.   
Different definitions of the current account deficit, foreign direct investment, and lending 
booms are considered.  We also test whether the benchmark regression is sensitive to 
different thresholds for the real exchange rate appreciation, and to different definitions of 
the international reserve adequacy dummy.  
- Sensitivity Analysis of the Results to Different Crisis Index Intervals 
We vary the time period crisis index from the month preceding the onset of the 
Mexican crisis (November 1994) and the East Asian crisis (June 1997) to six months 
later.  Recall that following Sachs et al. the benchmark regression uses the crisis index for 
the period of four months, i.e., from November 1994 to March 1995 for the Mexican 
crisis, and from June 1997 to October 1997.  Table 6 shows that the signs and the 
significance of all coefficients are the same across the six periods.   The estimated 
coefficients of COM4 (b2) are significant and negative for all crisis intervals. Similarly, 
the coefficients of lending booms (b3) are significant and positive for all crisis intervals.  
When the length of the crisis interval is longer, the fundamental factors appear to play a 
larger role in determining the pattern of contagion across countries.  In all crisis intervals, 
the null hypotheses of b2 + b4 = 0 and b3 + b5 = 0 cannot be rejected.  However, the R-
squareds and adjusted R-squareds decline as the time period is extended. 
ADD TABLE 6 
- Sensitivity Analysis of the Results to Different Weights in the Crisis Index   30 
  In order to investigate whether the weights of each component of the crisis index 
have a substantial impact on the estimated results, two alternative weights –one that gives 
more weight to a change in exchange rate and one that gives more weight to a change in 
foreign reserves – are used.   Column 3 in table 7 shows the results of the composite 
model whose crisis index assigns a 0.8 to a change in foreign reserves and a 0.2 to a 
change in the nominal exchange rate and column 4 shows the results of the benchmark 
model where the crisis index assigns a 0.2 weight to a change in foreign reserves and 0.8 
weight to a change in the nominal exchange rate.  Compared to the results of the 
benchmark model, whose crisis index is weighted equally, the signs, size and significance 
of the estimated coefficients are similar.  b2 rises somewhat when more weight is given 
to reserve changes and falls when more weight is given to exchange rate changes.  The 
coefficients on b3 are virtually unchanged.  The hypotheses of b2+b4 = 0 and b3+b5 = 0 
cannot be rejected.  While the differences in the adjusted R-squareds are not great, the 
equal weighted version performs best on this score.  In brief, the results are not sensitive 
to the weight of the crisis index.  
ADD TABLE 7 
- Sensitivity Analysis of the Results to Different Periods of the Current Account, 
FDI, and Lending Booms 
Next, we test the sensitivity of the benchmark to different calculations of current 
account deficit, FDI, and lending booms.  Note that the benchmark regression uses a five-
year average of the current account over GDP and the FDI over GDP, and a five-year 
growth rate in lending booms.  These definitions are chosen for the sake of comparison to   31 
studies by Sachs et al. (1996), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), and Tornell (1999).  Table 8 
presents the sensitivity analysis for different length periods.  Column 4 uses a four-year 
period prior to the crises in constructing the current account deficit, the foreign direct 
investment, and the growth rate in lending booms.  Column 5 uses a three-year period 
and column 6 uses a two-year period.  The signs and the significance of all coefficients 
are similar to those of the benchmark regression. 
It should be noted that the magnitude of the COM4 coefficient (b2) decreases as 
the number of periods is shortened.  This result is not surprising since the shorter the 
external problems persist, the less serious the problem appears.  For example, one year of 
a current account deficit may reflect an intertemporal adjustment of people to smooth 
consumption and may be temporary because the current account deficit resulting from 
higher consumption today can be financed by the future surplus resulting from lower 
consumption tomorrow. 
On the other hand, the magnitude of the coefficient on lending booms (b3) 
increases as the number of periods is shortened.  Note also, however, that the adjusted R-
squared of the equation grows consistently as the time interval is extended.  While the 
coefficient on lending booms drops substantially, its standard error drops even more.   
Thus we conclude that the true coefficient is much more likely to lie in the 0.2 to 0.3 
range estimated with the three to five year intervals than around the 0.6 level estimated 
from a two year interval. 
  ADD TABLE 8   32 
- Sensitivity Analysis of the Results to Different Thresholds of Real Exchange 
Rate Appreciation 
Next we tested whether the results from the benchmark regression are sensitive to 
the thresholds for the real exchange rate appreciation.  In the benchmark regression, the 
COM4 variable is defined as the size of the current account deficit not financed by flows 
of foreign direct investment if the real exchange rate is greater than a 10-percent 
threshold.   For sensitivity analysis, 15-percent, 7-percent, 5-percent, and 3-percent 
thresholds of real exchange rate appreciation are used to calculate the COM4 variable and 
put into the regression.  The estimated results are presented in column 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of 
table 9.  The estimated coefficients of the COM4 (b2) are negative and significant in all 
regressions.  Interestingly, the magnitude of coefficient b2 increases as the threshold of 
real exchange rate appreciation increases.  The result implies that the current account 
deficit is more worrisome if the real exchange rate is more appreciated.  However, the 
standard errors of the coefficient of the COM4 variable increase as the threshold 
increases as well, and this reduces the significance of the estimated coefficient.  The fits 
of all regressions are roughly the same, except for the 15 percent threshold where the 
adjusted R-squared falls to only 32 percent.  The regression using a 3-percent threshold 
has the highest adjusted R-squared.  These results suggest that there is not a clear 
threshold level for real exchange rate appreciation to be important. 
ADD TABLE 9 
- Sensitivity Analysis of the Results to Different Definitions of the High-Reserves 
Dummy   33 
In the benchmark regression, the dummy for high reserves is one if the ratio of 
M2 to reserves is in the lowest quartile of the sample; otherwise it is zero.
34  By this 
definition, only one-fourth of the sample is classified as high-reserve countries.  To test 
the sensitivity of the result, different quartiles of the sample are used to define the dummy 
variable.  Column 4 in the table 10 defines the dummy of high reserves as when the ratio 
of M2 to reserves is below the second quartile of the sample.  By this definition, half of 
the sample is classified as high-reserve countries, and the other half as non high-reserve 
countries.  The estimated coefficients of the COM4 (b2) and lending booms (b3) 
variables change very little and the adjusted R-squared is almost identical.   The Wald 
coefficient test cannot reject the null hypotheses of b2 + b4 = 0, and b3 + b5 = 0, 
suggesting that reserves in the top half of the sample can prevent vulnerable countries 
from suffering a severe crisis.   
The fifth column in table 9 defines the dummy of high reserves as when the ratio 
of M2 to foreign reserves is below the third quartile of the sample.  By this definition, 75 
percent of the country sample is classified as high-reserve countries, and 25 percent of 
the samples is classified a non-high–reserve countries.  The last column shows that the 
results deteriorate.  The estimated coefficients of b2 and b3 are, of correct signs, but 
insignificant and the adjusted R-squared falls substantially.  The Wald coefficient test of 
b2 + b4 = 0 is rejected at the five-percent significance level.  This suggests that countries 
must do more than just avoiding very low levels of reserves, but that super high levels of 
reserves do not offer substantially greater protection than high levels.  
                                                            
34  Given that there is no theoretical explanation about the high reserves in relation to M2, ranking the 
number by using a quartile scale is the way that most studies used to measure the high reserves. However, it 
may be better to find the optimal absolute level of high reserves.  This subject is left for future research.   34 
ADD TABLE 10 
The ratio of short-term foreign debt to foreign reserves is another suggested 
measure for reserve adequacy.  The dummy for high short-term debts to foreign reserves 
takes the value of one if the ratio of short-term debts to foreign reserves is less than one; 
otherwise, it is zero.  The threshold of one is set because there is theoretical explanation.  
“A ratio greater than one…does indicate vulnerability to a crisis: once something sparks a 
withdrawal of foreign capital, each foreign creditor has an incentive to demand 
repayment quickly, since each one knows that there is not enough foreign exchange to 
repay them all” (Radelet and Sachs, 1998, p. 25).  The last column of table 9 presents the 
results of the regression using the dummy of short-term debts to foreign reserves to 
interact with the COM4 and the Lending Booms variables.  The estimated coefficient of 
COM4 (b2) rises a good bit while the coefficient of Lending Booms (b3), remains almost 
the same as does the adjusted R-squared.  The Wald coefficient test cannot reject the null 
hypotheses of b2+b4 = 0 and b3+b5 = 0, implying that a low ratio of short-term debts to 
foreign reserves can reduce the severity of crisis.  In short, there is not a substantial 




The econometric findings in this study suggest that fundamentals played a 
substantial role in explaining the contagion effects during the 1994 Mexican crisis and 
the 1997 Asian crisis.  However, while the stability tests of the model cannot reject an   35 
identical structure for the Mexican crisis and the Asian crisis periods, the model explains 
the pattern of “Tequila” effects much better than that of the “Asian flu.”  The 
fundamentals from the best model explain 67 percent of the pattern of the Mexican crisis, 
but only 22 percent for the Asian crisis. 
  It should be noted that the regression is a parsimonious model that considers only 
a limited number of related fundamental variables.  The regression results clearly 
understate the role of fundamentals in causing the contagion because there are other 
economic and political fundamentals that are not captured by the model.  It can be 
concluded with confidence that the spillover effects after both the Tequila and Asian 
crisis were not entirely random as implied by a complete pure contagion view, but this 
does not rule out the possibility that pure contagion played some role. 
  The regression results are more definitive in terms of evaluating hypotheses about 
the sources of a country’s vulnerability to contagion.   The lending boom, as a proxy of 
bank weaknesses and excessive credit expansion, is very significant and stable in all 
regressions, implying that the bank weaknesses and the domestic credit expansion 
increase a country vulnerability to a crisis.  When considered independently in the 
regressions, the real exchange rate, the current account deficit and FDI, are significant 
only in some studies.  When the three variables are combined together, however, they are 
significant in all of our regressions.  Accordingly, we believe that the composite indicator 
of current account, FDI, and real exchange rate is a useful indicator of external 
vulnerability to financial contagion.  Lastly, the estimation results suggest that adequate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
35 Bussière and Mulder (1999) find that the short-term debt to reserves ratio works better than the M2 to 
reserves ratio in their analysis.   36 
foreign reserves in relation to liquid money or in relation to short-term external debts can 
help prevent an otherwise vulnerable country from suffering a crisis. Thus reserve 
management should be given a prominent place in countries’ strategies for dealing with 
potential currency crisis.
36 
                                                            
36 See also Bussière and Mulder (1999), Fischer (1999) and Willett and Denzau (1999).   37 
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b3+b5  Lending booms with 
high reserves 
0.01  0.02 0.01 
 Summary  Statistic       
 R-Squared  0.52  0.20  0.35 
 Adjusted  R-Squared  0.42  0.05  0.29 
 Addendum:Wald  Test       
  Ho: b2 + b4 = 0  p-value 0.83  p-value 0.74  p-value 0.80 
  Ho: b3 + b5 = 0  p-value 0.67  p-value 0.82  p-value 0.66 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical 
significant at a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 
percent level. 
a.  The dependent variable is the crisis index from November 1994 to March 1995 for 
the Mexican crisis period, and from June 1997 to October 1997 for the Asian crisis 
period. 
b.  COM1 is an average of current account deficit to GDP between 1990 and 1994 for 
the Mexican crisis and between 1992 and 1996 for the Asian crisis if the average of 
budget deficit to GDP for the same period is greater than 3 percent; otherwise, it is set 
to zero.   38 
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b3+b5  Lending booms with 
high reserves 
0.02  0.02 0.01 
 Summary  Statistic       
 R-Squared  0.63  0.35  0.44 
 Adjusted  R-Squared  0.55  0.21  0.39 
 Addendum:Wald  Test       
  Ho: b2 + b4 = 0  p-value 0.36  p-value 0.95  p-value 0.66 
  Ho: b3 + b5 = 0  p-value 0.50  p-value 0.89  p-value 0.71 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical 
significant at a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 
percent level. 
a.  The dependent variable is the crisis index from November 1994 to March 1995 for 
the Mexican crisis period, and from June 1997 to October 1997 for the Asian crisis 
period. 
b.  COM2 is the real effective exchange rate appreciation from 1990 to 1994 for the 
Mexican crisis and from 1992 to 1996 for the Asian crisis if the average share of the 
current account deficit of the same periods is greater than 5 percent; otherwise, 
COM1 is set to zero. 
 
   39 








1994 and 1997 
Crises 







b with an 








b3  Lending booms with an 













b3+b5  Lending booms with 
high reserves 
0.01  0.01 0.01 
 Summary  Statistic       
 R-Squared  0.71  0.41  0.56 
 Adjusted  R-Squared  0.64  0.28  0.52 
 Addendum:Wald  Test       
  Ho: b2 + b4 = 0  p-value 0.77  p-value 0.58  p-value 0.57 
  Ho: b3 + b5 = 0  p-value 0.67  p-value 0.93  p-value 0.74 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical 
significant at a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 
percent level. 
a.  The dependent variable is the crisis index from November 1994 to March 1995 for 
the Mexican crisis period, and from June 1997 to October 1997 for the Asian crisis 
period. 
b.  COM3 is the share of average current account deficit to GDP between 1990 and 1994 
for the Mexican crisis and between 1992 and 1996 for the Asian crisis if the real 
effective exchange rate appreciates by more than 10 percent; otherwise, COM2 is set 
to zero.   40 








1994 and 1997 
Crises (Benchmark) 







b with an 








b3  Lending booms with an 













b3+b5  Lending booms with 
high reserves 
0.02  0.01 0.01 
 Summary  Statistic       
 R-Squared  0.73 0.35  0.56 
 Adjusted  R-Squared  0.67 0.22  0.52 
 Addendum:Wald  Test       
  Ho: b2 + b4 = 0  p-value 0.99  p-value 0.71  p-value 0.59 
  Ho: b3 + b5 = 0  p-value 0.55  p-value 0.84  p-value 0.65 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical 
significant at a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 
percent level. 
a.  The dependent variable is the crisis index between November 1994 and March 1995 
for the Mexican crisis, and between June 1997 and October 1995 for the Asian crisis. 
b.  COM4 is an average, between 1990 to 1994 for the Mexican crisis and between 1992 
to 1996 for the Asian crisis, of current account deficit to GDP less a share of foreign 
direct investment to GDP if an real effective exchange rate appreciation is greater 
than 10 percent threshold; otherwise it is zero.  
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Independent Variables  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  The Benchmark 





b with an 








b3  Lending booms with an 













b3+b5  Lending booms with 
high reserves 
0.001  0.01 0.01 
 Summary  Statistic       
 R-Squared  0.79  0.58  0.56 
 Adjusted  R-Squared  0.51  0.55  0.52 
 Addendum:Wald  Test       
  Ho: b2 + b4 = 0  p-value 0.43  p-value 0.58  p-value 0.59 
  Ho: b3 + b5 = 0  p-value 0.99  p-value 0.66  p-value 0.65 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical 
significant at a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 
percent level. 
a.  The dependent variable is the crisis index between November 1994 and March 1995 
for the Mexican crisis, and between June 1997 and October 1997 for the Asian crisis. 
b.  COM4 is an average, between 1990 to 1994 for the Mexican crisis and between 1992 
to 1996 for the Asian crisis, of current account deficit to GDP less a share of foreign 
direct investment to GDP if an real effective exchange rate appreciation is greater 
than 10 percent threshold; otherwise it is zero.  
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b2  COM4 with an 














b3 Lending  booms
 
with an absence 























0.001  0.008 0.009  0.01  0.005 -0.001 
 Summary Statistics        
  R-Squared  0.49 0.54 0.47 0.56  0.42 0.26 
  Adj  R-Squared  0.44 0.50 0.42 0.52  0.37 0.19 
  Addendum: Wald  Tests        

























Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical significant at 
a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 percent level. 
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Table 7: Sensitivity Analyses of the Results to Different Weights of the Crisis index 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Independent Variables  Assign more Weight 















b2  COM4 with an 








b3  Lending booms with 








b2+b4  COM4 with high 
reserves 
-0.68 -0.72  -0.69 
b3+b5  Lending booms with 
high reserves 
0.01 0.01  0.01 
 Summary  Statistic       
 R-Squared  0.51  0.45  0.56 
 Adjusted  R-Squared  0.46  0.40  0.52 
 Addendum:Wald 
Test 
    












Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical 
significant at a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 
percent level. 
a. The crisis index is defined as IND = 0.2(%∆ Exchange Rate) – 0.8(%∆ Reserves). 
b. The crisis index is defined as IND = 0.8(%∆ Exchange Rate) – 0.2(%∆ Reserves   44 
Table 8: Sensitivity of the Result to Different Periods of the Current Account Deficit, the 
























b2  COM4 with an 










b3 Lending  booms 
with an absence 














b3+b5 Lending  booms 
with high reserves 
0.01 0.01  0.01 -0.02 
  Summary   Statistic      
 R-Squared  0.56  0.49  0.35  0.31 
  Adjusted R-Squared  0.52  0.44  0.29  0.24 
 Addendum:  Wald  Test       
  Ho: b2 + b4 = 0  p-value 0.58  p-value 0.62  p-value 0.70  p-value 0.83 
  Ho: b3 + b5 = 0  p-value 0.66  p-value 0.81  p-value 0.97  p-value 0.90 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical significant at 
a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 percent level. 
a.  The benchmark regression uses the average of current account deficit and foreign direct 
investment to GDP between 1990 to 1994 for the Mexican crisis and between 1992 to 1996 
for the Asian crisis.  And lending boom is defined as the percentage change in the ratio of 
claims on private sectors to GDP from 1990 to 1994 for the Mexican crisis, and from 1992 to 
1996 for the Asian crisis.   
b.  Independent variables use the four-year periods of 1991-1994 for the Mexican crisis and 
1993-1996 for the Asian crisis. 
c.  Independent variables use the three-year periods of 1992-1994 for the Mexican crisis and 
1994-1996 for the Asian crisis. 
d.  Independent variables use the two-year periods of 1993-1994 for the Mexican crisis and 
1995-1996 for the Asian crisis.   45 
Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis of the Result to Different Thresholds of Real Exchange 
Rate Appreciation 




























b2  COM4 with an 
absence of high  
reserves 










b3  Lending  booms 
with an absence 













COM4 with high 
reserves 




with high reserves 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
  Summary    Statistic      
  R-Squared  0.38  0.56 0.5 0.51  0.57 
  Adj  R-Squared  0.32 0.52 0.46 0.46 0.53 
  Addendum:  Walt  Test      
  Ho: b2+b4 = 0  p-value 0.90  p-value 0.58p-value 0.91 p-value 0.51p-value 0.38 
  Ho: b3+b5 = 0  p-value 0.69  p-value 0.66p-value 0.61 p-value 0.60 p-value 0.57 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical 
significant at a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 
percent level. 
a.  In the benchmark regression, the COM4 variable is defined as the current account 
deficits that is financed by financial flows only if the real exchange rate appreciation 
is greater than 10-percent threshold.  
b,c,d,e  15-percent, 7-percent, 5-percent and 3-percent thresholds of real exchange rate 
appreciation are used to calculate the COM4 variable.   46 
Table 10: Sensitivity Analysis of the Results to Defining the High-reserve Dummy 
Estimated 
Coefficient 





















b2  COM4with an absence 









b3  Lending booms with an 














b3+b5  Lending booms with 
high reserves 
0.01 0.02  0.04 0.02 
 Summary  Statistic         
 R-Squared  0.56  0.55  0.48  0.54 
 Adjusted  R-Squared  0.52  0.51  0.44  0.50 
 Addendum:Wald  Test         
  Ho: b2 + b4 = 0  p-value 0.58  p-value 0.47  p-value 0.06  p-value 0.60 
  Ho: b3 + b5 = 0  p-value 0.66  p-value 0.47  p-value 0.15  p-value 0.27 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical 
significant at a 5 percent level.  Two asterisks (**) indicate statistical significant a 10 
percent level. 
a.  In the benchmark regression, the dummy for high reserves(D=1) is assigned to a 
country that its ratio of M2 to reserves is below the lowest quartile of the sample. The 
lowest quartile is 2.18 for the 1994 sample, and 2.7 for the 1997 sample. 
b.  The dummy for high reserves(D=1) is defined when a country’s ratio of M2 to 
reserves is below the second quartile, i.e., 4.05 for the 1994 sample, and 4.14 for the 
1997 sample. 
c.  The dummy for high reserves(D=1) is defined when a country’s ratio of M2 to 
reserves is below the top quartile, i.e., 6.12 for the 1994 sample, and 5.77 for the 1997 
sample. 
d.  The dummy for high reserves(D=1) is defined when a ratio of short-term debts to 
foreign reserves is below one.   47 
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Data  Appendix 
-Crisis Index (IND) is an indicator-weighted average of the exchange rate change with 
respect to the U.S. dollar minus the percentage change in foreign reserves.  An increase in 
the index corresponds to a more severe crisis.  We use November 1994 as the initial point 
for the Mexican crisis and June 1997 as the initial point for the Asian crisis and a later 
month as the end point.  Each of the two components is weighted equally.  The exchange 
rate (line ae) and the reserves (line l.d) data are availabe from IFS CD-ROM 
-Real Exchange Rate Appreciation is the percentage increase in the real effective 
exchange rate index from 1990 to 1994 for the Tequila crisis and 1992 to 1996 for the 
Asian crisis.  A rise in the index means the real exchange rate appreciation.  The real 
effective exchange rate index is from the JP Morgan real exchange rate database. 
-GDP is the gross domestic product.  The GDP data are from IFS CD-ROM (line 99b) 
-Current Account is the average share of current account to GDP between 1990 and 1994 
for the Mexican crisis and between 1992 and 1996 for the Asian crisis.  The current 
account data are from IFS CD-ROM (line 78 al)\. 
-Government Budget is the average share of budget account to GDP between 1990 and 
1994 for the Mexican crisis and between 1992 and 1996 for the Asian crisis.  The 
government budget account data are from IFS CD-ROM (line 80).  For Hong Kong, the 
government budget account data are from Hong Kong Census and Statistics. 
-Lending Booms are the percentage change in the ratio of claims on the private sector to 
GDP from 1990 to 1994 for the Mexican crisis and from 1992 to 1996 for the Asian 
crisis.  The claims on the private sector data are from IFS CD-ROM (line 32d).   51 
-The Dummy for high reserves is one when a ratio of M2 to reserves is below the lowest 
quartile of the sample.  This ratio is calculated for November 1994 for the Mexican crisis 
and June 1997 for the Asian crisis.  The M2 data are from IFS CD-ROM (line34 plus line 
35).  Alternatively, the dummy for high reserves is one when a ratio of short-term 
external debts to reserves is less than one.  This ratio is calculated for December 1994 for 
the Mexican crisis and June 1997 for the Asian crisis.  The short-term external debt data 
are available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/debt/. 